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Abstract
Despite numerous treaties and international agreements aimed at stopping genocide, genocidal mass
killings continue to take place within the current international system. In order to better understand
how to best combat genocide, scholars have developed two main approaches: intervention and prevention.
The interventionist approach argues genocide can be stopped in its tracks through use of military force
and targeted diplomacy, while the preventionist approach argues pre-emptive action is needed to truly
stop genocide. Both approaches, however, have relied too heavily on hypothetical analysis of how past
genocides could have turned out differently given certain factors. This study instead aims to use case
study analysis to compare two “genocidal moments”—one where genocide did take place, Srebrenica in
1995, and one where genocide did not take place, the Kosovo War in 1998 and 1999. To define this term,
“genocidal moment,” this study uses Gregory Stanton’s “The 10 Stages of Genocide.” Ultimately, this
study concludes that effective humanitarian interventions cannot remain neutral and, instead, must side
with victims and against perpetrators.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the efforts of many different NGOs, inter-
national organizations, and individual states since
the end of World War II, genocide and similar mass
killings have continued to take place. In particular,
the United Nations has created numerous genocide-
prevention institutions that the international commu-
nity has failed to live up to1;2. Given their longstanding
use of rhetoric condemning genocide and the catas-
trophic consequences of inaction, it is necessary for in-
ternational organizations like the UN to change their
approach with regards to genocide in order to truly
improve international norms. This research will use
the term “genocidal moment”—which itself will be de-
fined using Genocide Watch’s “The Ten Stages of Geno-
cide”—in order to refer to both instances of completed
genocide and instances of potential genocide that never
progressed to Stanton’s “extermination” stage3. This
research aims to compare two specific cases—the geno-
cide in Srebrenica and the Kosovo War—to isolate what
variables are most important to stopping “genocidal
moments.” Indeed, what are the necessary conditions
to stop genocidal moments from progressing to extermi-
nation? By examining genocidal moments in Srebrenica
and Kosovo, this paper attempts to answer that ques-
tion.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In the field of genocide studies, two main approaches
to avoiding genocide predominate: intervention and pre-
vention. The first approach supports the use of “hu-
manitarian intervention”—a combination of targeted
diplomacy and military force by the international com-
munity—to stop genocide in its tracks4;5;6. The latter
approach, on the other hand, doubts the effectiveness
of this humanitarian intervention and instead supports
the prevention of genocide before it can even begin,
often by fostering appropriate conditions for reducing
conflict in countries where warning signs of genocide
exist7;8;2. While both sides agree that it would be prefer-
able if genocide never occurred at all, preventionists
doubt the international community’s ability to effec-
tively intervene while interventionists, more optimistic
on that front, doubt the international community’s abil-
ity to first predict, and then prevent, genocide. Never-
theless, both interventionist and preventionist scholars
have largely used hypothetical analyses to speculate on
how past genocides might have been avoided in devel-
oping their policy recommendations. This is an obvious
weakness in much of the genocide studies literature and
my own research attempts to avoid this hypothetical
analysis by examining the different outcomes of two
actual genocidal moments: the Srebrenica Genocide and
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the Kosovo War. But first, what solutions to genocide
have previous scholars developed?
To start with, interventionist scholars, for the most
part, have focused on how military force can be used
to stop genocide. Interventionists all agree that military
force can be an effective tool for stopping genocide, but
debate among themselves on the appropriate ways mil-
itary force should be used to be most effective4;5;6. Scott
Feil, for example, reported on a conference held by the
Carnegie Corporation that aimed to determine what the
ideal military response would have been to the Rwan-
dan genocide to save the most lives4. The conference
of mostly military experts, including General Romeo
Dallaire, who led the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in
Rwanda during the genocide, ultimately found that a
force of about 5,000 appropriately armed, trained, and
organized men could have significantly altered the out-
come of the genocide if they deployed between April
7th and April 20th, 19944.
Similarly, in an analysis of NATO intervention in
Kosovo during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War, Peter Ron-
ayne argued that military force could have been used
in specific ways to significantly improve outcomes in
Kosovo. While Ronayne still acknowledged that the
NATO airstrikes played a significant role in avoiding
a potential humanitarian disaster—mostly by breaking
Serbian domestic support for war—he argued that the
use of ground troops could have importantly hindered
Serbian forces in a way that airstrikes did not6. Ron-
ayne thus warned the lessons from Kosovo should be
taken with caution as the air campaign only defeated
Serbian forces politically, and not militarily6.
Another interventionist scholar, Arash Pashakhan-
lou, disagreed that NATO airstrikes were significant
in ending the conflict in Kosovo, but similarly argued
that the use of ground troops could have dramatically
changed outcomes. Pashakhanlou argued that, not only
were the airstrikes militarily ineffective, but that they
actually “accelerated. . . human rights abuses” before
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic caved to diplo-
matic pressure. In particular, Pashakhanlou pointed out
that atrocities were committed by Serbian forces during
every day of the three-month NATO air campaign5. He
compared airstrikes in Kosovo to a similar NATO air
campaign in Libya where Libyan rebels acted as surro-
gate ground forces. According to Pashakhanlou, the air
campaign in Libya was far more effective because of
this added ground support as well as because of several
other key factors like better “geography, diplomacy and
technology”5. In any case, despite some disagreement,
the research conducted by the Carnegie Corporation,
Ronayne, and Pashakhanlou all similarly ventured to
discover the specific uses of military force needed to
improve the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention
by the international community.
Preventionist scholars, by contrast, have claimed that
there are fundamental flaws with this approach7;9;2. For
example, in an analysis of the Rwandan genocide, Alan
Kuperman assessed a specific, hypothetical scenario
where “The president of the United States, upon deter-
mining that a genocide was in progress in Rwanda, had
unilaterally ordered the expeditious deployment of an
U.S. intervention force”8. To ensure his hypothetical
was “legitimate” and “contendable,” Kuperman lim-
ited his alterations to the past to that single counterfac-
tual statement and, through an analysis of government
reports and on-the-ground primary source accounts,
found that military intervention would have failed to
save most of the victims8. In particular, Kuperman ar-
gued that, while military preparedness could have been
improved, the main reason why military intervention
would have failed is because the international com-
munity would not have realized genocide was taking
place and responded properly before at least three quar-
ters of the Tutsi population was already killed, given
the speed of the genocide8. Instead of military inter-
vention, Kuprman argued international actors should
emphasize de-escalating civil wars diplomatically since
genocide often occurs after civil war8.
David Hamburg similarly called for a preventionist
approach. According to Hamburg, early warning signs
present themselves years before killing takes place in ev-
ery genocide7. Furthermore, he argued that within well-
crafted cooperative international institutions, “strong
democracies and humane organizations could reach
out proactively to nations in trouble”7. Specifically, he ar-
gued that this “proactive” aid should target certain “pil-
lars of prevention,” which included preventive diplo-
macy, democratization, equitable socio-economic devel-
opment, education, international justice, and restraints
on weaponry7.
Finally, in their analysis of United Nations responses
to genocide, Samuel Totten and Paul Barthrop were
far less optimistic than Hamburg concerning the role
cooperative international institutions could play in
preventing genocide. Totten and Barthrop found that
the United Nations rarely acted to prevent genocide
throughout its history because of Cold War tensions
and a still-present reluctance among member-states to
violate the principle of state sovereignty2. Totten and
Barthrop also argued that when the UN did act to inter-
vene in genocide, it was mostly ineffective (they cited
the examples of Rwanda and Bosnia while acknowledg-
ing the exception of East Timor). Totten and Barthtop,
therefore, doubted humanitarian intervention’s effec-
tiveness primarily because they doubted that the hu-
man rights norms necessary for international action
actually exist, despite the rhetoric used since the UN
conventions on genocide in 1948. In this sense, Kuper-
man, Hamburg, and Totten and Barhtrop all doubted
the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention in their
research.
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In any case, as mentioned above, interventionist and
preventionist scholars alike have relied far too heav-
ily on hypothetical analysis for developing solutions
to the problem of genocide. While this has not always
been the case, such as Hamburg’s discussion on actual
genocide prevention in South Africa or Pashakhanlou‘s
discussion on effective airstrikes in Libya, many schol-
ars have opted to ask “what if” in determining how
genocides can be stopped. This research instead aims to
look at how key genocidal moments actually ended in
the hopes that this may teach scholars and policymak-
ers something about how to stop genocide. To learn if
any generalizable findings exist around how genocidal
moments have actually ended, this study compares the
cases of the genocide in Srebrenica and the Kosovo War.
3 RESEARCH BODY
3.1 Method – Defining “Genocidal Moment” and
Selecting Cases
In order to best compare the various factors that could
possibly stop genocide, it is important that this study
does not limit itself to only one set of outcomes. There-
fore, this study will not only consider events in which
genocide occurred, but also events where—while indi-
cators of genocide existed—genocide did not occur. This
research, therefore, builds on the premise some schol-
ars have suggested that genocide is always preceded
by observable indicators8;7. Furthermore, to describe
these indicators, this research will use Genocide Watch’s
“The 10 Stages of Genocide”3. This study argues that
in “genocidal moments” many of these ten stages occur,
but that the crucial stage, “extermination,” does not nec-
essarily take place. This concept of “genocidal moment”
is used in order to determine the case selection of this
study.
Somewhat unhelpfully, however, Genocide Watch’s
founder, Gregory Stanton, defers to legal definitions
of genocide when describing extermination: “extermi-
nation begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing
legally called ‘genocide.’ It is ‘extermination’ to the
killers because they do not believe their victims to
be fully human”3. Therefore, to supplement Stanton’s
stages, this research will also use the widely-cited legal
definition of genocide used by the United Nations in
Article III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
"In the present Convention, genocide means
any of the following acts committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing se-
rious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring chil-
dren of the group to another group10."
Given Stanton’s description of extermination as the
“mass killing legally called genocide,” this study will
use this UN definition to determine extermination in
various genocidal moments.
This research compares the genocidal moments of the
Srebrenica genocide and the Kosovo War. This study
argues that both cases constitute genocidal moments
because throughout both the Kosovo War and the Sre-
brenica genocide several key stages of genocide were
reached—including the later stages of organization, po-
larization, preparation, and persecution3. The genoci-
dal moment of the Kosovo War, however, was stopped
before extermination occurred, whereas in Srebrenica
extermination was allowed to take place.
This study follows a “most similar” selection strat-
egy in comparing the Srebrenica genocide and the
Kosovo War. In both cases, the perpetrators were
the same, or close to the same, (Bosnian Serbs sup-
ported by Serbia/Yugoslavia in Srebrenica and Kosovo
Serbs/Serbian/Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo) and be-
cause the context was similar (armed conflict following
the dissolution of Yugoslavia in both cases). These simi-
larities make it easier to determine important variables
that contributed to the differing outcomes of these geno-
cidal moments.
3.2 Case 1: Srebrenica
The genocide of Muslim men and boys that took place
in Srebrenica in July of 1995 occurred within the broader
context of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s bloody civil war
and the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. As com-
munism ended within Yugoslavia, old nationalist and
ethnic tensions began to rise between the various con-
stituent republics; these resurgent ethnic/nationalist
tensions were a necessary progression on the path to
genocide in Srebrenica11. Still, Stanton’s first stage of
genocide, classification—or the existence of “categories
to distinguish people into ‘us and them’ by ethnicity,
race, religion, or nationality”—had long existed in Sre-
brenica and Yugoslavia broadly as people living in the
region were often categorized by their nationality or
ethnicity (Serb, Bosniak, Croat, Albanian etc.) and were
further categorized by their religion (Muslim, Chris-
tian etc.)3. Moreover, for Muslim peoples living in Yu-
goslavia like Bosniaks or Kosovar Albanians, the sec-
ond stage—symbolization—had also long existed since
differences between Muslim and Christian dress often
made it visually obvious who belonged to what group.
Importantly, Stanton notes that “Classification and sym-
bolization are universally human and do not necessarily
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result in genocide unless they lead to dehumanization”
so their long existence in Srebrenica and Yugoslavia
is not surprising and does not necessarily constitute a
“genocidal moment”3.
In any case, ethnic and nationalist tensions further
escalated in post-communist Yugoslavia when the con-
stituent republic, Serbia, opportunistically seized uni-
lateral power over the federal government in the early
1990s11. Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic sup-
ported Serbian minority movements demanding for
the resignation of the governments in Montenegro and
in the autonomous province, Vojvodina, and, following
these resignations, “hand-picked Milosevic men” were
put in power in both governments11. Milosevic then,
using military force, stripped Kosovo of its autonomy,
giving Serbia its vote in the federal government11. With
the federal votes of Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and
Kosovo, Milosevic was able to effectively dominate the
Yugoslavian federal government11. Fearing a Serbian
dominated Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia soon se-
ceded in 1991 and following these secessions war soon
broke out. Accepting his failure to dominate all of for-
mer Yugoslavia, Milosevic did little to resist the seces-
sion of areas with no significant Serbian population like
Slovenia, and instead focused on creating a “Greater
Serbia” where large parts of the other republics with
Serbian minorities were brought under Serbian rule11.
This included large parts of Croatia, resulting in
the war which broke out between Croatia and Ser-
bia/Yugoslavia in 1991, but more importantly, it in-
cluded even larger portions of the ethnically diverse
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sharing Milosevic’s vision of
a “Greater Serbia,” Serbian paramilitaries supplied by
Yugoslavia seized large areas within Bosnia and Herze-
govina and declared independence12. Supported by
Yugoslavia, this newly independent, Respublika Srpska
well outmatched Bosniak and Croat fighting forces in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and “seized control of about
60 percent of Bosnia”11.
Within the territory they captured, Bosnian Serbs
then began brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing in
which other Bosnian minorities—especially Croats and
the Muslim, Bosniaks—were forcibly removed from
their homes by military forces11;12. This ethnic cleans-
ing campaign represented a rapid progression through
the stages of genocide. Stage three, discrimination, oc-
curred because Serbs used their political power to deny
the property rights of Bosniaks and Croats. Stage four,
dehumanization, occurred because Serbs used dehu-
manizing hate propaganda to justify the campaign.
Stage five, organization, occurred because Serb paramil-
itaries were established to fight the war, carry out the
ethnic cleansing, and “to provide deniability of state re-
sponsibility” for Yugoslavia/Serbia3. And finally, stage
six, polarization, occurred because extremists drove
“the groups apart” physically and rhetorically, isolating
moderates advocating for Serb, Croat, and Bosniak co-
existence3. Moreover, to accomplish their ethnic cleans-
ing campaign, Serb paramilitaries used “mass killings,
forced displacement, torture and rape, and the destruc-
tion of private and public property, including religious
objects”12.
By April of 1992, this violence reached Srebrenica
when Bosnian Serbs attacked the city—killing 27 peo-
ple12. Soon after, however, “the Bosnian Army recap-
tured the city” and Srebrenica became an enclave within
Bosnian Serb territory “into which refugees streamed
from throughout the Podrinje region”12. By the end of
1992, the population of Srebrenica had risen to around
30,000 of mostly refugees12.
In response to the atrocities being committed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations—which
had already declared a peacekeeping mission in the
ongoing war in Croatia—extended the mandate of the
United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croa-
tia to also include Bosnia and Herzegovina in the sum-
mer of 199213;14;15; UNSC Resolution 770; Tardy 2015).
Alongside the extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate,
peace talks were also opened up between the Bosnian
government and the Respublika Srpska in September
199211. The approach of the United Nations, however,
was guided by a view of “the conflict as a part of a long-
term ethnic contest that had been underway for many
centuries and whose real origins lay in a murky Balkan
past. Since all sides were equally guilty the argument
went, the only solution was to mediate and compro-
mise over territorial issues”11. This view directed the
peacekeeping mission and negotiations; negotiations
aimed at dividing up Bosnian and Herzegovina into
different territories for different ethnicities while the
peacekeeping mission focused on humanitarian aid and
the “creation of so-called ‘safe-areas’”15. These efforts
did not properly target Bosnian Serbs as aggressors and,
instead, aimed to separate belligerents. Of course, this
peacekeeping mission represents a form of “human-
itarian intervention” by the international community,
although interventionist genocide scholars will be quick
to point out this intervention was not meant to stop an
ongoing genocide, but instead was meant to protect
civilians during a civil war.
On April 16, 1993, the UN declared that “all parties
and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surround-
ings as a safe area which should be free from any armed
attack or any other hostile act” in a Security Council
resolution16. About 7,600 UNPROFOR forces were de-
ployed to maintain this and other “safe areas” (“Sara-
jevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Zepa, and Gorazdje”) within Bosnia
and Herzegovina and were authorized only to use force
in self-defense12;15. Despite the declaration of a “safe
area,” Bosniak forces in Srebrenica still “maintained
its own defenses” which included some 1,500 lightly
armed soldiers12.
Developing Effective Intervention
The following year, in March of 1994, a “Dutch battal-
ion of 570 soldiers relieved” older UNPROFOR troops
in Srebrenica12. These Dutch troops were the active
force in the UNPROFOR mission in Srebrenica when the
genocide took place in the summer of 1995. Upon arriv-
ing in Srebrenica, the Dutch battalion became frustrated
with the refusal of Bosniak forces to demilitarize and
with the “dismal conditions within the enclave;” some
of the soldiers even seemed to treat the refugee popula-
tion with contempt as one piece graffiti in their barracks
demonstrated: “No teeth. . . ?/A moustache. . . ?/Smells
like shit. . . ?/Bosnian girl!”12. Well before the 1995 at-
tack, relations between the UN soldiers and the Bosniak
refugees were “tense” and “often marked by mutual
distrust”12.
In June of 1995, Bosnian Serbs ignored UN Security
Council Resolution 819 and attacked Srebrenica12. The
Bosnian Serbs quickly captured two Dutch observa-
tion posts with little resistance in early July12. On July
6, upon receiving fire, UNPROFOR commander Tom
Karremans surrendered more posts without putting
up a fight12. More UN positions fell, and by July 9 the
Bosnian Serbs were attacking the city of Srebrenica it-
self12. Hesitation among UN decision makers halted
UNPROFOR requests of NATO air strikes12. Bosniak
forces too hesitated in responding to the Bosnian Serb
aggression, worried that by fighting in the designated
“safe area,” they might deprive themselves of UN and
NATO support12. Disastrously, this led to the com-
plete victory of the Bosnian Serbs who, by July 11,
had captured the city and began separating Bosniak
men and boys from the women; following negotiations
with UN forces, the women and young children were
also forcibly deported from the city with assistance
from the UN peacekeepers12. By this point, Bosnian
Serb paramilitaries were already planning the genoci-
dal killings of the Bosniak men and boys; as such the
situation progressed to Stanton’s seventh stage, prepa-
ration. Furthermore, by separating the men and boys
and gathering them in a concentrated area, the Bosnian
Serbs also committed stage eight, persecution, where
“Victims are identified and separated out because of
their ethnic or religious identity”12. In this case, gender
identity was also a determining factor for separating
victims.
Fearing the worst, however, many of the separated
Bosniak men decided to try and escape and formed a
column that ventured into the woods hoping to flee
to Bosnian-government held territory12. The column
was shelled and ambushed by Bosnian Serbs who used
machine guns and small arms on the Bosniaks while
they ran through the forest. The vast majority of the
men were killed12. Men captured from the column and
many of those who chose not to flee were also executed
in mass and by July 17 an estimated 8,000 Bosniak men
and boys had been killed12. Stage nine, extermination,
had been reached. In the years following the genocide,
Serbia also progressed to the final stage in Stanton’s
model, denial12.
3.3 Case 2: Kosovo War
The 1998-1999 Kosovo War was preceded by a long his-
tory of Serbian domination in the majority-Albanian
region of Kosovo and, similar to the Bosnian War, the
conflict was caused in part by communism’s collapse in
Yugoslavia. Despite an overwhelming Albanian major-
ity, Kosovo had long been a constituent region within
Serbia, and later Yugoslavia, since the 1913 Balkans
War6. Under communist rule, Kosovo had been al-
lowed some autonomy as Tito’s regime “emphasized
‘Yugoslav’ identity,” but this changed as communism’s
hold over the Balkans weakened in the late 1980s6. Suc-
cumbing to military pressure by Serbian leader, Slobo-
dan Milosevic, the Kosovo Parliament, “ringed with Yu-
goslav army tanks,” was forced to pass a constitutional
amendment giving up regional autonomy in November
of 1988. Civil rights abuses—including the removal of
ethnic Albanians from government and the suppression
of Albanian language newspapers—followed the dis-
solution of regional autonomy6. Like in Bosnia, stages
one and two—classification and symbolization—had
long existed in Kosovo. People were classified by their
national identities—namely, Serb and Albanian—and
differences in Muslim and Christian dress often visu-
ally demonstrated who belonged to what group. The
civil rights abuses caused by Serbia’s takeover of power
further progressed the situation to stage three, discrimi-
nation3.
For many Serbs, Kosovo’s importance to Serbian na-
tional identity stretched back much farther than Serbia’s
20th century rule over the region. It had been on Koso-
var land that the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje—or “the
Field of Black Birds”—had taken place. In this battle,
Serbian Prince Lazar faced off against the invading Ot-
toman Empire in what became a semi-mythical battle
of martyrdom for Christian Serbs11;6. For many, this
battle made Kosovo integral to Serbian national iden-
tity. Kosovo was seen as a part of Serbia’s ancestral
homeland and many Serbs were greatly alarmed at the
“growing Albanian birth rate, and Serbian emigration
patterns” which led to Kosovar Albanians making up
“some 90 percent of the population” by the late 1990s6.
This concern over national heritage led many Serbs to
feel culturally threatened by the very existence of Al-
banians in Kosovo and it significantly contributed to
the popularity of hateful rhetoric against Albanians in
Serbian media. As Albanians began to resist their dis-
crimination, this hate escalated and soon stage four,
dehumanization, was reached where “hate propaganda
in print and on hate radios. . . [was] used to vilify the
victim group [Albanians]”3.
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At first, Albanian resistance to increasingly discrimi-
natory Serb rule was peaceful; many non-violently fol-
lowed the literary historian, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova6. By
the mid-1990s, however, frustration with a lack of suc-
cess led the movement for Kosovo independence and
Albanian civil rights to turn violent6. A new organiza-
tion, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK), began
a campaign of terrorist attacks against Serbian author-
ities, first starting with attacks against policemen and
bombing in Serb refugee camps in 199617. By 1998, Ser-
bia sent security forces to Kosovo in order to combat
the KLA and fighting escalated17. Soon, Serbian forces
began not only fighting the KLA, but used violence
against the civilian population in their effort to quell
the insurgents17. Notably, in March of 1998, Serbian se-
curity forces killed “fifty-three Kosovo Albanians (half
of whom were women and children) in response to a
KLA attack near Drenica”6. Massacres like this quickly
escalated the threat of genocide. With Serb forces mobi-
lized against civilians, stage five, organization, had been
reached. Furthermore, by connecting ordinary civilian
Albanians with the insurgent KLA, Serb media further
pushed the situation into stage six, polarization, where
moderates in the perpetrator group were drowned out
by extremist messages driving Serbs and Albanians
apart3.
The potentially genocidal violence against the Al-
banian population drew the attention of many inter-
national actors, including the UN, NATO, Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE),
and the “Contact Group”—including France, Germany,
Russia, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States6.
In response to the March 1998 civilian killings, the
UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on
Serbia6. Nevertheless, as the fighting continued, vio-
lence against the civilian population only became more
widespread and “by mid-September 1998 some 250,000
Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes
and some 50,000 were still in the open as winter ap-
proached”6.
In February of 1999, negotiations were established
in Rambouillet, France, between a Kosovo Albanian
delegation and the Yugoslavian/Serbian government6.
The talks aimed to protect the rights of all sides and
give Kosovo autonomy, but not independence6. While
the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed a draft of the
agreement, the Serbs refused to commit to it and talks
were suspended in March 1999 when an estimated
“40,000 police and soldiers and 300 tanks” were po-
sitioned by Serbia around Kosovo6. By now, stage
seven—preparation—seemed to be rapidly manifest-
ing as the Serb forces surrounding Kosovo were likely
preparing for more violence against civilians. The “ex-
trajudicial killings” and “genocidal massacres” that oc-
curred in 1998 were also key signs of stage eight, perse-
cution, in Stanton’s model3.
Without UN approval, direct NATO action in the con-
flict began on March 24, 1999 in response to the failed
negotiations17. Rather than continue third-party diplo-
macy, NATO became “a secondary warring party to the
conflict” and launched an air campaign that attacked
Yugoslavian military targets around Kosovo and within
Serbia17. The military effectiveness of the campaign was
questionable, however; planes were not flown from be-
low 15,000 feet and the actual damage to Yugoslavian
forces seems to be lower than what NATO reported5.
According to a third-party, Munitions Effectiveness As-
sessment Team (MEAT), the campaign only scored 18
APC (Armored Personnel Carrier) kills and 20 artillery
piece kills—lower than what NATO estimated in its self-
assessment18. Operating at 15,000-feet, NATO planes
were also more likely to hit civilian targets by mistake5.
Nevertheless, the air campaign was effective because
of its impact on the political situation in Yugoslavia.
NATO bombings made Milosevic’s war in Kosovo
unpopular. A series of contemporary newspaper ar-
ticles written by New York Times journalist, Steven
Erlanger, in 1999, demonstrates this impact. “NATO
Attacks Darkens City and Areas of Serbia” (May 3,
1999) discussed the impact NATO bombings of a hy-
droelectric dam had on Belgrade’s population. “Bombs
Pound Heart of Serbia’s Capital” (May 1, 1999) dis-
cussed the devastating effect NATO misses had on res-
idential areas in Serbia. And “Pressure on Milosevic
Grows: Key Opposition Leader Joins Rally Asking Milo-
sevic to Resign”—while written shortly after Serbian ca-
pitulation—discusses a rally of 20,000 Serbs opposed to
Milosevic that demonstrated Serb dissatisfaction with
the Milosevic regime. In the rally, opposition leader,
Vuk Draskovic “spoke of the need for Serbs ‘to discuss
and accept the shame for what was done in Kosovo’”19.
On June 10, 1999, the Yugoslavian president finally ca-
pitulated. Serbian forces were withdrawn and “Nearly
all of the Kosovar Albanians returned to the province”6.
As part of the agreement, Kosovo remained a part of
Serbia, but was governed by the UN Interim Adminis-
tration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and continually protected
by UN/NATO forces6. UN sanctions and negotiations
sponsored by the international community had both
failed; in the end, NATO bombs brought an end to the
killing in Kosovo and Stanton’s key stage nine, extermi-
nation, was avoided.
4 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS
4.1 Discussion
The most important difference between the two genoci-
dal moments of Srebrenica in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999
was the approach the international community took in
military intervention. Both cases had otherwise similar
contexts as they both took place due to the Milosevic
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Srebrenica Genocide Kosovo War
DV: Did extermination
occur?
Yes, the Bosniak population was
forced from Srebrenica and an esti-
mated 8,000 Bosniak men and boys
were killed
No, while civilians were killed,
NATO action eventually put an end
to the conflict and allowed for the




Yes, peace talks opened up in
September of 1992
Yes, talks were established in Ram-
bouillet in April of 1999
Were negotiations ef-
fective?
No, the Bosnian Serbs did not ac-
cept the negotiations because they
already held more territory than ne-
gotiators were offering them11
No, talks fell through in March 1999;





Yes, the UN enacted sanctions
against Yugoslavia and UN peace-
keepers were sent into Bosnia
Yes, UN sanctions were enacted and
many diplomatic efforts were made
by the Contact Group
Were victims com-
pletely unarmed?
No, Bosniak forces managed to re-
pel the Bosnian Serbs for a time but
eventually succumbed; most victims
after the fall of the city were civilians
No, the KLA engaged in combat




No, in Srebrenica the killing only
stopped when the entire city had
been “cleansed” by the Bosnian
Serbs
No, when Milosevic capitulated, Ser-





No, UNFORPOR did not attack the
Bosnian Serbs; they treated Serbs
and Bosniaks as mutually culpable
belligerents to be separated from
one another and even showed con-
tempt for the Bosniak population in
Srebrenica
Yes, NATO forces aided the KLA
militarily by targeting Serbian forces
Caleb Bryan
regime’s quest for a “Greater Serbia.” Moreover, there
was little difference in the effectiveness of international
diplomacy, which failed in both instances. The key dif-
ference that allowed for a better outcome in Kosovo was
NATO’s clear marking of Serbia as perpetrator and its
subsequent use of military force against Serbia. While
the air campaign was not necessarily a military success,
it had a profound effect on Milosevic’s political support
and that brought an end to the conflict. By contrast, the
UNPROFOR troops deployed to Srebrenica during the
Bosnian War failed to designate the Bosnian Serbs as the
aggressors and aimed to create a neutral “safe zone” in
Srebrenica. This approach failed disastrously when UN
forces quickly surrendered to attacking Bosnian Serbs
in 1995 and extermination followed thereafter.
Nevertheless, while Kosovo was certainly a more
successful intervention than the abject failure of UN
peacekeeping in Srebrenica, it is important not to ig-
nore its limitations. In both the case of Srebrenica and
Kosovo, intervention forces were too worried about
protecting their own personnel and material to effec-
tively influence the military situation—UN forces sur-
rendered without a fight and NATO refused to deploy
ground troops or fly below 15,000 feet because they wor-
ried even light causalities would be too costly6. Used
against a more politically stable regime, it is hard to
say that the approach NATO intervention took in the
Kosovo War would be effective.
This research, therefore, has limited generalizabil-
ity. The Kosovo War turned out to be more compli-
cated than a clear-cut NATO success story, even if ex-
termination was avoided. Atrocities were allowed to
continue against the Albanian population throughout
NATO’s intervention and Serbian civilians were mis-
takenly killed by missed bombings. Moreover, NATO
intervention likely only succeeded because of the spe-
cific political instability of the Milosevic regime in 1999.
Still, this research does find that intervention was at
least somewhat successful in Kosovo and unsuccessful
in Srebrenica. It reveals little about the effectiveness
of preventionist approaches, however, as this was not
substantially attempted in either case. Furthermore, it
shows that when the international community inter-
venes in genocidal moments, it is important to distin-
guish between preparator and victim and not to treat
both sides with mutual distrust.
Finally, this research shows that in Srebrenica the
genocide only ended when the Bosniak population was
almost totally removed from the region. This horrific
end demonstrates that if there is no intervention in an
ongoing genocidal moment, it will not likely otherwise
stop until it has run an extremely destructive course. By
contrast, much of the Albanian population in Kosovo
was spared due to an early end to the conflict and al-
most all Kosovar refugees were allowed to return home.
From this finding, it might be concluded that interven-
tionist strategies should be developed, even if only in
conjunction with more proactive preventionist ones,
because without them genocidal moments that have
progressed past preventionist measures cannot be com-
batted. A genocidal moment cut short is still better than
one left alone, even if its most preferable that genocidal
moments never occur at all.
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